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IPDS: Still the future of training? |
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 Tony Prosser gives an overview of the history of the Integrated Personal Development System, as well as examining some of the issues that have sprung up since its implementation
HIDDEN AWAY IN DRAWERS ALL ACROSS the country, there are copies of an instruction manual still cherished by many. The manual, a Fire and Rescue Service examiner’s guide to running practical exams for firefighters, is being kept by senior managers in the hope that one day the Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS) will disappear and things will become like they were in the 1990s.
This return to a perceived golden age is, however, unlikely to materialise – the world has moved on, becoming a (theoretically) brighter place where competence is king. It would be foolish to assume that all really is perfect however. In fact there is a continuing rumbling of discontent that IPDS is still failing to deliver on its promise of a safe firefighter concept and a more competent workforce.
There are many questions that need to be answered about IPDS, and about firefighters’ relationship to it. Is there a challenge for perception management, or are the worries deeper than a superficial concern about style over substance? Are things really as bad as some would have the Fire and Rescue Service believe, and if they are and nothing is done, what will be the consequences? Have we now gone full circle with a project that had its origins in the tragic death of two firefighters, but is still not preventing similar tragedies occurring 15 years later?
Service Evolution
The Gillender Street fire in 1991 was a landmark in the evolution of the fire and rescue services in the UK. Two London firefighters lost their lives while trying to negotiate a guide line in a building on fire. Although some of those present at the time had doubts about the ‘culture’ (common in many busy services where it was assumed that high operational activity levels would compensate for physical and practical training in hardware and procedures), the Health and Safety Executive served an improvement notice that ultimately led to the creation of the National Training Strategy Group in 1992. After a 13-year gestation, the Fire and Rescue Service was given full responsibility for IPDS implementation in December 2005. In the meantime, the old ways of doing things – promotion, training and development – were left by the roadside.
The post-dispute Fire and Rescue Service has evolved, building upon the good practices that were already in use in many brigades in the 1990s – ie, community fire prevention, business liaison, road traffic collision reduction and education of children and young people. A new service with new roles requires workers with different attributes and qualities, focussing on prevention rather than response. Unfortunately many of the changes have been viewed with scepticism, bordering on cynicism. Many of the criticisms are widespread. They include the idea that promotion now depends more on ‘telling a good tale than doing good deeds’, that the learning schemes tailored for the individual fail to deliver at ground level and that bureaucracy has the potential to overwhelm managers. The list goes on. Some have reached the status of urban myth but, whether founded in fact or fiction, the perception among many firefighters across the country is that IPDS is not working.
Training Models
The first potential ‘problem’ facing the Service is that in the years since a competency  based model of training was introduced nationally in the late 1990s, the focus of the service has drifted from the fireground and drill yard skills to that of delivery of community fire safety. The need to train firefighters in challenging environments was recognised in the early 1980s by the Health and Safety Executive, and the HSE National Industries Group produced generic guidance in the form of its publication Training for Hazardous Occupations. (More commonly known as the NIG report.) Although the number of accidental fire deaths are being successfully reduced, the deflection from operational excellence to delivery of ‘softer’ challenges has been claimed to be having a detrimental effect on the overall operational performance of the service. At an individual firefighter level, the instinctive ability to throw up a ladder with professional confidence, or to enter a burning room safely was drilled into trainee firefighters through hours of repetitive equipment handling and exposure to hazards in controlled but challenging environments. This, it is being claimed in some quarters, could be responsible for the increase in the number of serious accidents involving firefighters. It would appear that there could be substance to this view. Furthermore, there is a belief that the focus of the UK FRS on prevention based activity (focussed predominantly on the National Framework Targets of 20 per cent reduction in fire deaths and injuries) has reduced its ability to manage the economic impact of fire.
Prevention Focus
An October 2006 editorial in World Fire Statistics Bulletin, produced by the International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, argued that a case could be made for the UK fire safety strategy, predominately focussed on the protection of life from fire in the home, which while successful has deflected attention from the potentially high economic loss sites. Fires at sites such as those at the industrial complex formerly known as Buncefield, with its direct losses of at least £80 million and consequential unemployment of up to six thousand workers. Nationally, with overall fire costs running at about 0.73 per cent of gross domestic product, the ability for firefighters to effectively intervene and control fires is essential if the economic impact of fire is to be managed.
The arguments above could be viewed as the nostalgic reminiscences of those nearing the end of their careers, reflecting on the days when ‘ladders were made of wood and firefighters of steel’. However, the need to redevelop basic operational skills and tactical command at incidents is rapidly becoming a mainstream view, rather than a look back through rose tinted spectacles. Two large fire and rescue services have started ‘back to basics’ courses following a number of near miss events that had the potential to threaten the safety of firefighters. Is this a tacit recognition of a failure of IPDS training systems to deliver the safe firefighter concept?
Time will tell, but this may be a development that shows a recognition that while the role of the firefighter has, and will continue to, evolve, there are fundamental safety critical skills which cannot be ‘signed off’ as meeting a minimum acceptable standard. Developed skills such as extensive and extended breathing apparatus operations, tactical ventilation and high-rise firefighting all require detailed knowledge and skill development, not maintenance of basic skills. The introduction of the continual professional development payment, now it is finally agreed, could redress some of the problems of continual improvement of individuals skills. How successful the CPD will be in delivering the ‘new professionalism’ will depend upon the mechanism by which it is delivered.
Waiting for Results
Professional associations such as the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) could meet the challenge if the structures for training delivery meet the needs of all members of the Fire and Rescue Service, rather than just an elite. It will be some years, however, before the results of these changes will be seen. All that could be said at the moment is that the reduction in the number of serious fires (due to preventionbased activity and earlier intervention due to smoke alarm ownership) is reducing skill development on the job. This emphasises the need for more quality training, rather than what is perceived by many as a de minimis approach that emphasises individual needs rather than the team or organisation.
Apart from delivering risk management services to the community, those selling the IPDS message must be able to get buy-in from firefighters and potential or existing managers seeking promotion. It is unfortunate that the widespread introduction of the assessment and development centres (ADCs) coincides with the biggest losses of experienced junior managers and firefighters for over a generation. Filling such a large void, particularly one that is key to fireground safety (these staff have traditionally been the repository of organisational knowledge) throws into stark relief the differences between the old guard and the new.
One day it may be said that the Service was unduly worried as IPDS will produce the junior leaders the Service needs, but at the moment it appears to be failing in the view of many to deliver a system that appears credible to those being led. Furthermore the loss of the knowledge-based examinations for the ranks of Station Officer, Sub Officer and Leading Firefighter has removed a key aspect in giving organisations a collective understanding of the fundamentals that govern the way the Service operates.
There does not at the moment appear to be an imperative to have more than a basic understanding of building construction and hydraulics and there is an onus upon individuals to develop themselves. And this is happening at a time when educational gurus are rethinking strategies on learning and development – fact based learning and exams to test underpinning knowledge and understanding of a subject.
So, at an operational level all is not rosy in the Fire and Rescue Service garden. How do the issues get resolved? The introduction of IPDS has been accompanied by a mixture of incomprehension on the part of some of those taking part in the systems (ADCs, ITOPs, the helical roller coaster and so on) and denial on the part of the IPDS proponents that there could be a need to address structural and long term problems, such as those detailed above. Both views need to take a ‘reality check’. IPDS in some form is here to stay but there needs to be an acceptance by the pro lobby that it does not matter how glossy the sales brochures, to get a system working properly the views of all stakeholders, particularly the firefighters (in all roles) and the fire and rescue services must be taken into account, acted upon and support for the system gained. Once recognition of the existing problems is acknowledged, moving on becomes easier.
Incorporation of Knowledge
The origins of the perceptual issues associated with the IPDS are in the way in which it was introduced. The Fire and Rescue Service is a conservative beast as successive governments have found. Despite the slow evolution of the system, the final introduction was swift.
Getting rid of the statutory examinations was carried out with indecent haste, despite being phased out over a couple of years, any incentivisation to encourage aspiring managers to take exams in the knowledge of their impending extinction was an exercise in futility. A synthesising of ADCs, supported by knowledge-based operational and practical examinations would provide a great deal of reassurance for the sceptics. Recognition and incorporation of the underpinning knowledge learned at training centres, supported by exambased confirmation at progression levels and using the Fire Service College as the centre of excellence to support and develop operational managers’ development is one way ahead. This may be too retrospective for many, however. When firefighters are making basic errors in areas such as pump operations and tactical risk awareness, some are asking, ‘has the baby been thrown out with the bathwater?’ The reaction of some fire and rescue services by taking a radical back to basics approach to aspects of operational training appears to support this view.
While only a small step at the moment, it could be the start of a return swing of the pendulum that could begin to redress the imbalance that some at the sharp end perceive to exist. Failure to look at the issue of IPDS and firefighter training and development now can only add to the risk facing firefighters on a daily basis. With the enormous quantity of staff changes that the Service is currently experiencing, now may be an opportune moment for sombre reflection on a development system that has promised so much but which many still doubt can deliver.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of West Midlands Fire Service. |
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